



NATIONALIZATION Of THE fRENCH CAPITAL 
IN CROATIA 1945 – AN EXAMPLE Of THE 
SODOAD COMPANY
Tomislav ANIĆ*
Immediately after the end of the Second World War, “the revolution-
ary forces” gained political power and the native and foreign capital owners 
gained economic power in Yugoslavia. The economic and political transfor-
mation necessary for the development of a socialist society was possible only 
by abrogating the existing proprietary relations. This is exactly the reason why 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ- Komunistička partija Jugoslavije) 
decided to disown all capital holders in order to withhold the material basis 
for the power struggle. 
Foreigners owned a substantial share of the capital and the industrial facil-
ities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After 1945, the actions of nationalization 
were also directed to that share of the wealth. Foreign capital had a share of 
49,51% in the entire industry, but in the most profitable branches it had a sig-
nificantly bigger share. For example, in the extract industry and the industry 
of connective materials there was a share of 77,9%, in metallurgy 90,9%, in the 
metal processing industry 55,8%, in the chemical industry 73,6%, in the tex-
tile industry 61,4%, and in the wood industry 51,4%.1 At first, the authorities 
of the new Yugoslavia had, from the political point of view, a different attitude 
towards the allied and the neutral countries, in contrast to those countries 
that had dismembered and occupied Yugoslavia during the war. The proper-
ty of Germany and German citizens, treated as the occupier’s property, was 
transferred to the State on the basis of the Decree on the transfer of the occupi-
er’s property to the State, on the State governing of the absent persons’ property 
and on the sequestration of property forcibly abalienated by the occupiers issued 
on November 21, 19442, while the property of Italian citizens was confiscat-
ed. Special mixed committees were established for the allied and the neutral 
countries. 
* Tomislav Anić, M.A., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Croatia
1  Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa centralnog komiteta KPJ (Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of KP (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije- Službeni list SFRJ 
1995), 458.
2 For a detailed account on the nationalization of the German property see the following 
works of Vladimir Geiger: Nestanak folksdojčera (Zagreb: Nova stvarnost, 1997), Nijemci u 
Đakovu i Đakovštini (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2001), Folksdojčeri. Pod teretom kolektivne krivnje 
(Osijek: Njemačka narodnosna zajednica - Zemaljska udruga Podunavskih Švaba u Hrvatskoj/
Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft - Landsmannschaft der Donauschwaben in Kroatien, 2002)
142
J. JUHÁSZ, Die ungarisch-kroatischen BeziehungenT. ANIĆ, Nationalization of the French Capital in Croatia
All foreign companies, regardless of the treatment, were charged for eco-
nomic collaboration with the enemy, and thus the Communist government 
did not intend to permit the continuation of their activity.
The question of foreign property (allied and neutral) was always regard-
ed within the international political context, and the Central Committee (CK) 
of the KPJ in December 1945 decided to resolve the foreign capital issue, as 
every postponement of such a serious international issue could cause much 
damage. According to the aforementioned plan, the Ministry of International 
Affairs of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ - Demokratska Federativna 
Jugoslavija) was instructed to notify all interested countries of Yugoslavia’s 
intention to determine the state of affairs of particular companies through 
the mixed committees. The establishing of the mixed committees by the CK 
KPJ did not give concrete results, because they were in charge of defining the 
framework and methods of solving the issues of foreign property. The foreign 
delegations advocated that all the decisions should be determined and intro-
duced according to international law, while the Yugoslav delegates thought 
that the issue of foreign property could be solved exclusively according to the 
principles of the national legislature and judicature. International law defined 
economic collaboration only in those instances when a company was placed 
at the disposal of the enemy on their own initiative, whereas Yugoslav law 
required only that the company continued its activity during the war in order 
to be confiscated. 3 
The entire legal system was aimed at creating the new social order. The fun-
damental legal mechanisms, which served the restructuring of the economy, 
consisted of sequestration, confiscation and nationalization. The confiscation 
during the war was conducted on the basis of different decrees with the force 
of law, issued by the Communist authorities. The dispossessed property was 
invested in the Integral National Liberation Fund. The decrees on the dispos-
session of property were implemented through a network of committees for 
determining war crimes and military courts. After the war, the KPJ began to 
modify the revolutionary legislature. One of the most significant acts was the 
passing of the Implementation of the Confiscation of Property Act on June 8, 
1945. The confiscation, as defined by the mentioned law, was a measure of dis-
possessing the entire property or part of the property without compensation in 
favour of the State, while sequestration, as the integral part of the Confiscation 
Act, implies provisional and preventive measures of dispossessing the proper-
ty from the owner by the executive bodies. The property was sequestered if the 
decision on confiscation had not been issued, because the proceedings were 
not started or were still in progress, and for the ”existing danger of abalien-
ation, encumbrance, damaging or decrease of the property’s value”, as the law 
defined it 4 The sequestration proceedings were most commonly started by 
the public prosecutor’s motion. After that, the executive units of the National 
3 Branko Petranović, Politička i ekonomska osnova narodne vlasti u Jugoslaviji za vreme obnove 
(Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1969), 243 - 245.
4 Službeni list DFJ, no. 40, from 12th June 1945.
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Administration of the People’s Goods (ZUND - Zemaljska uprava narodnih 
dobara), the National Committee for Establishing the Crimes of the Occupiers 
and Their Accomplices (ZKRZ - Zemaljska komisija za utvrđivanje zločina 
okupatora i njihovih pomagača) or the public prosecutor, appointed a tempo-
rary management over the sequestered companies until the court reached the 
final decision on the matter of ownership. In most cases, the foreign compa-
nies owned the sequestered property. After the war, the State Administration 
of the People’s Goods (DUND - Državna uprava narodnih dobara), estab-
lished in November 1945, managed the nationalized property and founded a 
network of units among the lower ranks of the authorities, at either the nation-
al or republican level, as well as in districts and towns.
The Ground Act on State Economic Companies from May 24, 1946, designat-
ed companies of the state and national character, which encompassed almost 
all native and foreign companies that were confiscated as well as sequestered. 
In this way the field of activity of the mixed committees was narrowed even 
more. The Yugoslav Communist authorities cut through the dilemmas over 
property by passing the Nationalization of Private Economic Companies Act 
on December 4, 1946, which transferred all private companies of state and 
national character in forty-two economic branches over to the State’s owner-
ship. By this Act the State agreed to render compensation for the confiscated 
companies. The process of reaching an agreement on the compensation did 
not go easily and bilateral agreements on compensation were achieved only 
after 1948, which were determined by the changed political circumstances in 
Yugoslavia after the conflict with USSR.
 The object of this article is the nationalization of foreign property on 
the territory of the People’s Republic of Croatia (NRH - Narodna Republika 
Hrvatska), using one French company as an example. The primary sources for 
the research are the dossiers of the company made by the representatives of 
the postwar authorities of the new state. 
According to the available sources, there is different information on the 
number of the French companies on the territory of the NRH after the Second 
World War. On the basis of the ZUND’s information, on the territory of the 
NRH there existed four companies.5 The sources and the secondary literature 
show that there were two proposals on the nationalization of the French com-
panies on the territory of the Federal Peple’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ - 
Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija): the first, which would not make 
concessions to the French and the second, which would subject the French 
companies to the mechanisms of testing through court procedures. 
5 This number of companies differs to the number mentioned in the correspondence between 
the French consulate in Zagreb and the republic institutions (the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and the Government of the NRH) regarding the number of proceedings concerning these 
companies. The fact that there are only two companies named in the analysed lists makes the 
problem more complicated. We can ascribe that to the disorganized functioning of the postwar 
bodies, which kept the evidence, and to the confused state of the institutions, which applied 
the measures of the nationalization. This work operates with the materials of ZUND, the body 
directly involved with the questions of property and the functioning of the postwar economy 
(see Appendix 1.).
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The purpose of accommodating the French companies in Yugoslavia 
was to acquire the French support in the Committee of the Ministers of the 
International Affairs that worked on the project of a peace treaty between 
Yugoslavia and Italy. Proponents of those tactics were not prejudging the final 
attitude towards the French capital, but were buying time. In the course of 
adopting these tactics, there was a suggestion to divide French companies into 
three categories: the first category, which does not include the elements of 
cooperation with the occupier as grounds for the confiscation of companies; 
the second, dubious companies for which the elements for indictment on the 
basis of economic collaboration with the occupier exist and therefore could be 
confiscated; and the third, including companies incriminated with strong evi-
dence for collaboration with the occupier. According to this plan, the French 
would be allowed to take over the companies from the first two categories. 6 It 
is obvious that there was no possibility for taking into consideration the first 
criterium of the second proposal, because in every case, even insignificant col-
laboration with the State or the state institutions was qualified by the postwar 
judicature as helping the occupier, regardless of the character of the manufac-
tured goods. The international circumstances mostly affected the solving of 
the problem of compensation. In 1948 a dialogue with the French side intensi-
fied and was mostly settled by an agreement in 1951. 
 As for French companies on the territory of Croatia, according to the eval-
uation of the Yugoslav authorities of that time, all of them  were charged with 
collaboration, therefore there were none that could be active in the new state. 
The most evident example for supporting this thesis is the correspondence 
of the French consulate in Zagreb and the Public Prosecutor’s Office of NRH 
regarding the criminal proceedings against French companies, specifically the 
examples of “La Dalmatienne” and SODOAD. 
The SODOAD Company
Until the middle of the twentieth century, four cartels (French, German, 
British and American) were engaged in the production of oxygen and acety-
lene, keeping in their hands the entire world’s production. Each of them had 
its sphere of interest. The French cartel “L’ Air Liquid” had branches in differ-
ent forms all over the world. In Italy this French cartel functioned as “Sio”, in 
Poland as “Perun”, and for the expansion in the southeastern Europe “L’ Air 
Liquid” founded a separate joint – stock company “Societé Orientale ď oxy-
gene et acetylene dissous” (SODOAD), which had its factories in Hungary, 
Yugoslavia and Romania. In Hungary, the company SODOAD worked under 
the name “Vulkan”, while in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia it had only a branch 
office. The branch in Yugoslavia, actually a factory for making oxygen, dis-
solved acetylene and compressed air, started working in Zagreb on the basis 
of a trade licence issued on February 19, 1930, which gave the company a per-
mit to trade carbide, machines and equipment for gas welding. The men-
6 Branko Petranović, Politička i ekonomska osnova narodne vlasti u Jugoslaviji za vreme 
obnove,  245.
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tioned components, which were items of business transactions, are of impor-
tance for gas welding and composing metal parts. This technique is performed 
using a high flame fire that is developed by the mixture of oxygen and acet-
ylene combustion, utilizing a special burner with two small lights. The com-
pany SODOAD also filled bottles and rented and sold the equipment and the 
instruments for gas welding.7
According to the business review done immediately after the war by the 
officials of the Central City Committee for establishing crimes of the occupi-
ers and their accomplices in the city of Zagreb, the manager of the branch from 
its founding until 1944 was a Frenchman, Jacques De Cock. The members of 
the Committee named nine acts proving the company’s collaboration with the 
Germans and the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) dur-
ing the war. Thus they state that, in spite of small number of memos found 
in the branch office of SODOAD, ”it can be clearly seen that the Board of 
SODOAD in Paris and the cartel “L’Air Liquid” had the only intention to do 
business a tout prix regardless of the political situation”. Judging by the avail-
able documents, the Committee concluded that ”the German army got acet-
ylen from the beginning of the occupation, and it seems that the SODOAD 
branch was in good relations with Wehrmacht”.8
The manager Jacques De Cock was at the same time an executive of the 
Hungarian “Vulkan” in Miškolc. SODOAD’s accountant gave the Zagreb 
Committee the most interesting characterisation of his political conduct dur-
ing the war. Generally, his conduct during the war, especially politically speak-
ing, involved meting  out punishments to the managers of companies that were 
accused of various violations. According to the postwar law, the conduct of a 
company’s manager automatically reflected on the company itself. The case of 
manager De Cock is therefore especially interesting. The files of the compa-
ny SODOAD hold the following observation on the manager: ”Politically, De 
Cock was De Gaulle’s supporter throughout the war and I can not recall his 
contacts with the French consulate. However, I know he was frequently invit-
ed to dinner by the German authorities, but he would not accept an invitation. 
In Semtember 1944, he expressed a desire to join the Partisans, because he was 
informed that Partisans received tanks, so he wanted to place himself at their 
disposal, as he had been a tanker in the last war. I linked him to comrade Hela 
Hoffman, now a clerk at the Ministry of Social Politics, and she took him over 
and went to the woods with him”.9 This unusual example shows how, during 
the nationalization, there was not a possibility of retaining private ownership 
7  Hrvatski državni arhiv (Croatian State Archives, HDA), Zemaljska komisija za utvrđivanje 
zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača (the National Committee for Establishing the Crimes 
of the Occupiers and Their Accomplices - ZKZR), box 675. Zapisnik sastavljen 15. prosinca 
1945. povodom pregleda poslovanja poduzeća SODOAD od Centralne gradske komisije za 
utvrđivanje zločina okupatora (Minute from the Dec. 15, 1945 on the bussines review of the 
SODOAD done by the Central City Committee for Establishing Crimes of the Occupiers and 
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over companies regardless of the positions its superiors assumed during the 
war. The company SODOAD and its executive De Cock exemplify this very 
well. Besides the mentioned active engagement in the war, De Cock resisted 
passively, according to the testimonies drafted during the review of the com-
pany: “…during the war they tried to produce as little as possible if the cir-
cumstances allowed, and from 1944 they were hiding the bottles and gas, as 
well as machines, which they could hide. So I know that De Cock hid sixty-
eight welding guns, which were delivered to the company after the liberation. 
In the same way the bottles that the Germans brought over for filling were hid-
den, in such a way that they were declared useless and kept in the factory. In 
this way, 600 bottles were saved.” 10
However, the courts almost regularly took such acts as intentional acts aimed 
at making profit at the end of the war, due to the deficiency of such goods on 
the market. These are not the only actions the workers of SODOAD, lead by 
executive De Cock, undertook during the war in order to obstruct German 
and Ustasha forces. Dossier SODOAD states that: “…during 1943, while fill-
ing the bottles with oxygen, the French consulate post with the knowledge of 
the company’s executive, did it in a way to cause an explosion once the bot-
tles were opened. Only the bottles used by the German army were prepared 
in this way, because it had its own bottles with a sign of its Feldpost.” One of 
the interrogated persons continues: “I’m familiar with the fact that in the mil-
itary mechanics workshop in Bihać the bottles filled with oxygen exploded 
twice, which caused the death of two Germans. After the second explosion, 
the Gestapo together with the Feldgendarmerie conducted an investigation, 
but could not establish anything.”11
Although in this case the company was 100% owned by the French, the 
property was not sequestered during the entire period of occupation, not even 
in Paris, and the authorities in the NDH did not appoint a commissioner; on 
the contrary, the company in this period continued its acitivities without any 
hindrance. After that, the supervision over the company was to a large extent 
put under the competence of the French Vichy consulate post in Zagreb.12
The General Department of the Ministry of Industry and Mining of the NRH 
presented the information on the collaboration of the company SODOAD on 
December 1, 1945. After an inspection of the company books, it came to the 
conclusion that, out of the entire output, SODOAD delivered its products to 




12 Croatian State Archives (HDA), the State’s Office for the Macroeconomic Analysis 
and Prognosis (DZMAP - Državni zavod za makroekonomske analize i prognoze), dossi-
er SODOAD, The Decree of the General Department of the Ministry of Industry and Mining 
issued to the Public Prosecutor’s for the city of Zagreb, the subject: Information on collabora-
tion of SODOAD, oxygen factory, Zagreb, from December 1, 1945.
13 Ibid.
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The rest of the output was mostly distributed to construction and engineer-
ing companies and the state’s railroads. According to the opinion of the mem-
bers of the General Department of the Ministry of Industry and Mining of the 
NRH, “these companies mostly worked for the occupiers’ needs.”14 Throughout 
the war, SODOAD was connected with its headquarters, as can be seen from 
the reports on production and distribution that were regularly sent to Paris. 
For all abovementioned reasons, the case of SODOAD was directed to the 
Public Prosecutor in Zagreb to continue the proceedings.
The report on the factory SODOAD, issued by the delegate of the Ministry 
of Industry and Mining on May 2, 1946, includes an analysis of the compa-
ny’s activities during the war, so that futher proceedings could be realized. 
Therefore, the report of the following content was placed on the desk of the 
Public Prosecutor for the city of Zagreb:
”In September 1939 the workers of the abovementioned factory went on a 
strike for salary and uniforms. During the strike the managemet of SODOAD 
expelled the workers by using police forces. The strike lasted for twenty-five 
days. After the occupier’s entered our country, there were many raw materials, 
which were used until 1943, when the company’s management contacted the 
German occupier and got raw material from them: carbide, peratol, etc., for 
the production of oxygene and dissugas.
In 1942, the company’s management made an agreement with the German 
occupier, so the workers got German identification cards, in order to make 
them more attached to the permanent work, and several times the German 
occupier’s inspection came to the factory. It stayed for a long, friendly conver-
sation with the management and inspected the factory, which remained under 
their supervision until the summer 1943.
In the summer of 1943, the company’s management, in agreement with the 
Ustasha power holders, recruited the workers, who had to take the Ustasha 
oath in front of captain Hamel, which was attended by the vice-executive of 
the factory, Brzeska Dragutin. After the Ustasha oath was taken, the work-
ers were recruited and the management started terrorizing and abusing them. 
They ordered them to work for twelve hours a day.” 15
In spite of the management’s threats of imprisonment and sending them to 
the frontline, the workers would not agree to the twelve hour work day. It is 
obvious from the reports that the factory’s management, in spite of close rela-
14 Ibid.
15 HDA, DZMAP, the subject SODOAD, A report from the delegate of the Ministry of 
Industry issued to the Public Prosecutor for the city of Zagreb, not dated.
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tions with the Germans, could not apply severe measures against the workers. 
That is most evident from the workers’ conduct during a bombing raid.
”When the bombing started, the manager closed all the doors so the work-
ers could not escape. That could not stop them from escaping, because they 
jumped over the fences. After that the management harshly warned them that 
they should not run away and leave the factory during raids, but that they 
should work. In spite of the strict orders from the management, the workers 
went on escaping.” 16
The management afterwards realized its incompetence in keeping the work-
ers in the factories during the raids, and then called captain Hamel to order 
the workers not to flee during future raids. As he came several times to the fac-
tory to threaten the workers with a prison sentence or service on the front-
lines, it is obvious that those measures had little effect.
Since the workers ignored the company’s and captain Hamel’s threats, the 
management offered them a 50% wage increase for the work done during 
bombing raids. Based on the facts mentioned above, the report concludes:
”In view of this, we can tell how the management used its workers and army 
forces to manage to produce more for the occupier, because this very impor-
tant product was indispensable to the occupiers’ and Ustashe’s motorized 
troops.” 17
The Department for the People’s Goods of the People’s City Committee of 
the city of Zagreb decreed on September 8, 1946 that, based on the decision 
of the Presidium of the Government of the NRH from March 12,  1946, the 
entire property of SODOAD with its factory facilities, which was sequestered 
by the People’s County Court’s verdict in Zagreb on October 29, 1946, should 
be placed under the expert management and economic utilization of the 
National Administration for the chemical industry, until its eventual liquida-
tion. A decree from November 26, 1946 had proclaimed this company to be of 
national importance and, after the Nationalization of the Private Companies 
Act was enacted on December 5, 1946, it became the State’s property. 18
The modalities of the property compensation agreed by the gover-
nments of Yugoslavia and france
Immediately after the war, the French government tried initiating nego-
tiations regarding the property of French individuals and corporations in 
Yugoslavia in order to solve all the property rights relations. A sequence of 
meetings held until 1948 did not produce a major breakthrough. With the fall-
ing out between Stalin and Tito in 1948, Yugoslavia started approaching the 
countries of the Western bloc to gain help for the defense of its independence. 
Part of the process of approaching the West in the summer of 1948 was the 
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capital holders. In July 1948 two agreements, one on the compensation for 
the nationalized property of the United States and the other on the  release of 
Yugoslav gold in the United States, were signed, and in December of that year 
a trade agreement between Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom was conclud-
ed.19 In spite of all that, the West still treated Yugoslavia with distrust, which 
eventually changed in the middle of 1949, when Yugoslavia distanced itself 
more radically from the USSR and its satellites. At that time, Yugoslavia direct-
ed the first appeals for help and consignment of the investment equipment and 
armaments. In connection with the newly arisen international circumstanc-
es, Yugoslavia’s attitude towards France started to change. Josip Broz Tito was 
aware that the resolution of the French nationalized property problem would 
likely lead to closer relations between the two countries. For the Yugoslav side, 
resolving this problem would create the possibility of gaining significant help 
from France in case of a possible future conflict with the USSR. Negotiations 
on compensation, begun in April 1949, were held through a mixed subco-
mission for the issues of the nationalized French property. At the very begin-
ning of the Committee’s work, differences of opinions on the method of the 
sum calculation occurred. The French side took the stand of the immediate 
negotiations on the sum, whereas the Yugoslav side advocated estimating the 
value of every company first and then adding their value to establish the whole 
sum. That led to disagreements, after the French side put forward a figure first. 
The French calculation was made based on information of companies’ value 
from 1939 in US dollars according to that year’s exchange rate. By that meth-
od the French figured out a sum of 138,956,865 US dollars, but considering 
the economic situation in Yugoslavia, as they stated, they reduced their claim 
to 79,257,167 US dollars. Yugoslavia estimated this sum as too high and unre-
alistic and questioned the method of calculation that the French applied and 
which, as the Yugoslav side stated, ”made it look like nothing happened from 
1941 to 1945.” The negotiations continued in such a way that the Yugoslav 
side expected the French delegation to revise the suggested sum. The negotia-
tions in the following months of 1949 were deadlocked. In October 1950,  Tito 
himself tried to approach the French, and in a conversation with the French 
ambassador Bode at the end of October, he again initiated the question of pur-
chasing French weapons and equipment, as well as the shipment of American 
weapons through France in order to avoid possible accusations coming from 
USSR of Yugoslavia being an American ally.  Tito assumed the French would 
initiate the unsolved issue of compensation for its property in Yugoslavia again 
in the next stage of negotiations. The Yugoslav side made the first step towards 
a solution of the problem at the end of 1950, offering 15 million dollars for all 
the nationalized French property, which would be paid off from export reve-
nues made in France. 20 
19 Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu, odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955 (Zagreb: Globus 
1988.), 59 – 60.
20 More on this question see in: Vladimir Lj. Cvetković, “Nacionalizacija francuskog kapitala u 
Jugoslaviji 1946-1951. godine”, Velike sile i male države u Hladnom ratu 1945-1955 (ed. Ljubodrag 
Dimić) (Beograd: Katedra za istoriju Jugoslavije Filozofskog fakulteta i dr., 2005), 251 – 264.
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The governments of France and Yugoslavia reached an agreement on the 
compensation of the French interests that occurred due to Yugoslav measures 
of expropriation – nationalization, expropriation and measures of property 
restrictions –, which was concluded in Paris in April 1951.
By this agreement, two governments agreed on the compensation of the 
French goods, laws and interests that were inflicted by Yugoslav measures of 
nationalization, expropriation and other ”similar restrictive measures.”21 The 
Yugoslav government agreed to pay the French government a sum of 15 mil-
lion US dollars in an equivalent value of French francs. The first article of the 
Agreement noted that it was mosty achieved on the basis of the Yugoslav pro-
posal on the compensation. It was agreed that the sum would be disbursed 
within ten years according to the specifics established in the additional pro-
tocol of the mentioned Agreement.22 The Agreement regulated the demands 
following from the Yugoslav measures of nationalization, expropriation and 
restrictive measures that affected French property, laws and interests (of 
French citizens and corporations which obtained that status on the day of 
implementation of the expropriation measures and on the day of passing this 
Agreement) in Yugoslavia. The agreement stated that compensation included 
the French shares in Yugoslav companies, but the French government did not 
obligate itself towards the Yugoslav shareholders of French companies. The 
French government took an obligation not to put forward or support requests 
for compensation of other French citizens or corporations.
The disbursement of the mentioned sum to the holders of French inter-
ests had a liberating effect on the Yugoslav state and institutions, citizens and 
corporations which were considered legal succesors of the original owners 
according to the Yugoslav legislature. The Agreement decided that the French 
government would take possession of the interested parties’ documentation 
regarding the property, rights and interests of the indemnified, to keep it and 
deliver it to the Yugoslav government after regulating it. The distribution of the 
total and lump sum compensation between the interested parties was under 
the exclusive competence of the French government and it did not imply the 
responsibility of the Yugoslav State or institutions, as well as Yugoslav citizens 
or corporations.
Thirteen years later, the Governement of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRJ - Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija) passed an 
executive order on the ratification of the French–Yugoslav Agreement on com-
pensation of the French goods, laws and interests nationalized in Yugoslavia, 
which were not regulated by the Agreement of April 1951.23 The Agreement 
in 1964 determined that in the name of the total compensation, the Yugoslav 
government would pay to the French government a sum of 200,000 US dollars 
in equivalent value of the French francs. The mentioned Agreement regulat-
ed the demands and claims not included in the Agreement from 1951, which 
were the consequence of the Yugoslav measures of expropriation that affected 
21 Službeni list  FNRJ, no. 15, 1952, 125.
22 Službeni list FNRJ, no. 15. 1952, 128-129.
23 Službeni list  FNRJ, no. 12, 1964, 943.
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the interests of French citizens and corporations having that status on the day 
of implementing those measures, or on the day of the signing of the Agreement 
(July 12, 1964). The French government was obligated not to submit or sup-
port demands regarding French citizens and corporations affected by the 
Yugoslav expropriation measures, directed towards the Yugoslav government 
or the Yugoslav natural persons and corporations in the period after the sign-
ing of the Agreement. The mentioned obligation of the French government, 
according to the Agreement, applied to the potential demands from individ-
uals without the status of French citizens, and to those who obtained that sta-
tus after the sigining of the Agreement, on the day of the implementation of 
the measures of expropriation. The same obligation was applied to the cases of 
demands which arose before May 15, 1945, which burdened Yugoslav citizens 
or corporations or the Yugoslav State as being against French citizens and cor-
porations that did not have that status on May 15, 1945. 24 It is assumed that 
there were no more open questions regarding French interests which resulted 
from the Yugoslav measures of expropriation after the Agreement in 1964.
Conclusion
This work provides an insight into the normative and judicial practice of the 
nationalization of foreign companies after the end of the Second World War 
in Yugoslavia and Croatia, exemplified by the case of the nationalization of 
French property. The subject of analysis is one French company – SODOAD.
The creation of the normative frame of the nationalization after the end of 
the Second World War marked the conflict between the new government and 
the bearers of capitalist economic relations. Basically, the materialization of 
the socialist ideas was carried out following the Soviet model. Adopting the 
Soviet model was the only possible choice as almost all of the Eastern European 
countries began the transition two to three years after Yugoslavia, which estab-
lished its political power most rapidly. The Soviet model and the accompany-
ing Marxist theory perceived collective ownership and State entrepreneurship 
as the foundation of Socialism. The nationalization of property had to be car-
ried out by the Communist Party as the bearer of the political power in order 
to gain control of the economy as the most important public sector. 
Property was expropriated on the pretext of collaborating with the occupier, 
and the laws passed for that purpose provided a means for the broadest possi-
ble interpretation of the term. 
This was the crucial problem of the economic life in the post-war period, 
indicating the possibility of the future unhindered development of the new 
system. Regarding the ownership structure, the new government wanted, at 
all costs and in the shortest period possible, to put all light and heavy indus-
try under its control in order to be able to continue implementing its defined 
plans. The only possible solution the new government came up with was set-
tling scores with the holders of the ownership rights, both native as well as for-
eign ones. The latter were approached with more caution, as the international 
situation required and which the Yugoslav Communist authorities respected.
24 Službeni list  FNRJ, no. 12, 1964, 944.
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The members of the KPJ were highly systematic regarding the making of 
the judicial foundation for the implementation of the measures of national-
ization during the war and at its end. The measures of nationalization can be 
divided into three categories: confiscation, sequestration and nationalization. 
In essence, those measures were of a class character.
Translated by Ida Ljubić
Appendix 1. 
Table 1:
The French capital in industry on the territory of the People’s Republic of 
Croatia
Name of factory Capital KN
The percentage of the 
French capital 
“La Dalmatienne” Frs. 
(FRF, FRANAKA)
156,500,000 100%
Sodoad, Zagreb kn 750,000 100%
DID, Sušak 2,000,000 100%
AGB, Zagreb 6,000,000 100%
TOTAL 165,250,000
Source: HDA, ZUND, Fascikl pošta upravnika, box 518.
Verstaatlichung des französischen Kapitals in Kroatien 1945 –  Beispiel 
des Unternehmens SODOAD
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit bietet den Einblick in die Norm- und Gerichtspraxis der 
Verstaatlichung ausländischer Unternehmen nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges 
auf dem Gebiet Jugoslawiens und Kroatiens am Beispiel der Verstaatlichung des 
französischen Unternehmens SODOAD. Das Schaffen des normativen Rahmens für 
Verstaatlichung nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bezeichnete den Konflikt der 
neuen Regierung mit allen Trägern kapitalistischer wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen. In 
ihrem Wesen wurde die Wiederbelebung sozialistischer Ideen nach dem sowjetischen 
Muster durchgeführt. Die Kommunistische Partei musste die Verstaatlichung des 
Eigentums durchführen, um die Wirtschaft als den bedeutendsten Staatssektor zu 
beherrschen. Das Eigentum wurde unter dem Vorwand der Zusammenarbeit mit den 
Besatzungsmächten entzogen und die Gesetze, die zu diesem Zweck verabschiedet 
wurden, boten die Möglichkeiten der breitesten Interpretation dieses Termins an. In 
der Tat waren die Maßnahmen der Verstaatlichung vom Klassencharakter gekennzeichnet. 
